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This paper employs a dynamic general equilibrium model to design and evaluate 
long-term unemployment insurance plans (plans that depend on workers’ unemployment 
history) in economies with and without hidden savings. We show that optimal benefit 
schemes and welfare implications differ considerably in these two economies. Switching 
to long-term plans can improve welfare significantly in the absence of hidden savings. 
However, welfare gains are much lower when we consider hidden savings. Therefore, we 
argue that switching to long-term plans should not be a primary concern from a policy 
point of view. 
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An important adverse effect of unemployment insurance is the disincentive to find/maintain
a job.1 Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) suggest that a possi-
ble remedy is switching to long-term contracts where benefit payments depend on workers’
unemployment history. In particular, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) show, by simulating a
search-theoretic model, that switching from the current US unemployment insurance system
to the optimal one may reduce the cost of the system by 30%. The optimal plan they pro-
pose provides a declining benefit path to create intertemporal incentives. It punishes workers
(agents) for continued unemployment and creates incentives to find a job. A maintained
assumption in these papers is that consumer/workers cannot save or, alternatively, that any
savings they undertake are perfectly monitored and thus completely controlled by the in-
surance provider. The main contribution of our paper is to study long-term unemployment
insurance plans by relaxing the assumption that agents’ savings can be perfectly monitored.
Thus, we consider “hidden savings.” We believe that introducing hidden savings is impor-
tant for at least two reasons. First, it is not realistic that perfect monitoring is available at
zero cost. Second, and more importantly, if savings cannot be monitored, the incentives of
consumer/workers change significantly. Suppose that we apply the unemployment insurance
system suggested by Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) to our
economy where agents have hidden savings. Then the agents would be tempted to cheat:
they would try to get a higher net present value transfer from the unemployment insurance
system and would deal with any implied increase in risk by self-insuring using their hid-
den savings. Thus, in an economy with hidden savings—where agents can self-insure—the
government-provided insurance may be less important and may change in nature.
We find that indeed it is important to consider hidden savings in the analysis. The nature
of the optimal unemployment insurance plans differs significantly from the ones suggested
by Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997): the benefit path is not
necessarily declining. We also find that the role of history dependence of unemployment
insurance plans is not as important quantitatively as the earlier studies suggest. Our analysis,
in fact, also suggests that unemployment plans that are designed ignoring agents’ ability to
save secretly could cause an increase in unemployment and be harmful to the economy.
The model we study is different from the ones analyzed in the cited papers in several
aspects. First of all, we do not look at fully optimal dynamic contracts since they are
difficult to characterize when agents have hidden savings. However, we consider a broad
1Hamermesh (1977), Moffit (1985) and Meyer (1990) estimate that a 10% rise in the replacement ratio
might cause a one-half to a one week increase in the length of unemployment spell. Meyer (1990) predicts
that 10% increase in benefits lead to an 8.8% decrease in the probability of leaving unemployment.
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set of history-dependent unemployment insurance plans. Secondly, we focus on the moral
hazard problem based on unobservability of job refusals as opposed to the job-search effort
as in Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). Thirdly, we insist on
budget balance of the unemployment insurance system. That is, there is a feedback of the
benefit part of the system to the tax on the labor income of employed agents. Therefore, we
choose a dynamic general equilibrium model for our analysis.
We study an extension of the model with incomplete markets analyzed in Hansen and Im-
rohoroglu (1992). To understand the role of hidden savings, we also consider a variant of our
model in which we shut down the savings channel. The economy consists of ex-ante identical
agents who derive utility from consumption and leisure. Agents are subject to unemployment
risk: at the beginning of each period, they are offered an employment opportunity with a cer-
tain probability. They can partially insure themselves against the possibility of income loss
by saving through non-interest-bearing assets. Agents also have access to an unemployment
insurance system financed by the government through proportional taxes. The system distin-
guishes agents according to their unemployment history: agents are offered different benefit
levels depending on how long they have been unemployed. We introduce moral hazard to
the model by assuming that government monitoring of insurance claimants is imperfect, i.e.,
the government monitors only a certain fraction of the claimants. Therefore, agents who are
not qualified (who refuse job opportunities) can collect benefits with a positive probability.
We refer to imperfect government monitoring as moral hazard. Because ineligible agents are
more likely to take advantage of the unemployment insurance system when the government
monitors a small fraction of claimants.
In this framework, our objective is to compute the unemployment insurance (UI) plans
that maximize the steady state equilibrium welfare. One should consider all possible employ-
ment histories to find “the” optimal UI plan in the context of dynamic contracting literature.
However, due to the computational complexity of this problem, we restrict our attention to
a certain degree of history dependence. The unemployment insurance plans that we consider
focus only on the most recent unemployment spell and distinguish agents with respect to
the number of periods they have been unemployed consecutively up to “T” periods. We
allow the benefit levels to be flexible for T periods and thereafter the benefit level is held
constant. We increase T up to a point beyond which increasing T does not improve welfare
significantly. We refer to the plan that maximizes steady state average utility as the optimal
UI plan. We use a variant of the evolutionary algorithms suggested by Gomme (1997) to
compute the optimal UI plans. This algorithm reduces computation time drastically and
makes it possible to solve otherwise infeasible optimization problems.
In this study, we analyze unemployment insurance in two different economic environ-
ments. In the first one, agents have hidden savings and in the second, they do not. Our
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analysis suggests that optimal benefit paths differ remarkably in these two economies. In
general, the optimal benefit levels are significantly higher and the optimal unemployment
insurance plan implies a declining benefit path when there are no savings. However, when
agents have hidden savings the optimal benefit path is not necessarily declining. Depending
on the degree of moral hazard, the benefit path can be non-monotonic or even increasing. Yet,
the optimal unemployment insurance plan implies a declining consumption path as Shavell
and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) argue. We also show that welfare im-
plications of long-term plans are different in these two economies. Our experiments suggest
that long-term plans can improve welfare significantly in economies without savings. For
example, the welfare gain of switching to long-term plans is 2.0133% of consumption.2 Yet,
the welfare gains are much lower if we consider savings in the analysis. The welfare gain
varies between 0.0325% and 0.1840% depending on the degree of moral hazard.
An important result of our analysis is that the welfare gains of switching to unemploy-
ment insurance plans that depend on the unemployment history are quite small when agents
have hidden savings. Even if the government can monitor a large fraction of unemployment
claimants, the welfare gains are as low as 0.06%. We show that our conclusion is not af-
fected by plausible variations in parameters. Given our results and the fact that long-term
unemployment insurance plans are hard to administer in practice, we argue that switching
to long-term plans perhaps should not be a primary concern from a policy point of view.
Finally, our findings reveal that unemployment insurance plans, designed ignoring agents’
ability to save privately, could be harmful to the economy. When we apply the optimal
plan from the economy without savings to our economy with hidden savings, a quite drastic
increase in unemployment results. This is because this plan critically uses history dependence;
in particular, it applies high benefit rates in the first few periods upon job loss. Thus, any
recently separated workers with access to hidden savings would choose to turn down new
job offers, collect the high benefit, and use hidden savings to smooth consumption. This
example also reveals the importance of taking into account the general equilibrium effects in
the design of unemployment insurance plans: the lower the employment rate is, the higher
the tax rate on labor income of the employed should be in order to balance the budget of
the unemployment insurance system. This feedback—which indeed is present in real life—
exacerbates the negative effects of improperly designed unemployment insurance systems on
the economy.
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) is the first study that analyzes the welfare effects of
unemployment insurance system in a general equilibrium environment with moral hazard
and savings. They concentrate on constant benefit schemes and argue that it is almost
2Welfare gains are computed as a percentage of consumption.
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impossible to insure agents for high degrees of moral hazard. We generalize their result by
showing that more complicated unemployment insurance plans do not provide much better
insurance when agents have hidden savings.
Long-term unemployment insurance plans in environments where agents have hidden
savings are also studied by Wang and Williamson (1999). They evaluate alternative un-
employment insurance schemes in a dynamic economy with unobservable job-search and
job-retention effort. Their main concern is to study welfare implications of long-term plans
and experience rating. They, too, report small welfare gains from switching to long-term
plans. It is noteworthy that they reach a similar conclusion to ours by using a different
framework. However, they do not specifically analyze how savings affect the nature and the
role of long-term unemployment insurance plans.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the economy. Section 3
discusses the calibration. Section 4 explains the algorithm used in the numerical solution.
Section 5 discusses calculation of welfare gains. In Section 6, we present our results. Section
7 provides an example regarding the importance of hidden savings. Section 8 presents our
conclusions.
2 The Economic Environment
2.1 The Model Economy with Savings
We use a dynamic general equilibrium model with hidden savings to analyze different unem-
ployment insurance plans. The economy consists of ex-ante identical infinitely-lived agents
who derive utility from consumption and leisure. Individuals maximize the expected value




βjU(cj , lj), (1)
where β is the discount factor, U(., .) is the momentary utility function, cj is the consumption
and lj is the leisure. Each agent has 1 unit of time in each period that can be allocated
between work and leisure. An agent either chooses to work a fixed amount of hˆ ∈ [0, 1) hours
and produces y units of consumption goods or does not work at all.
In this model, agents can save through non-interest bearing assets but they cannot borrow.
Assets evolve according to the following equation:
m′ = m+ yd − c, (2)
where m is the asset holdings in the current period, c is the consumption in the current
period, m′ is the asset holdings in the next period, and yd is the disposable income at the
current period.
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Agents are offered employment opportunities according to a stochastic process. Let s
denote the employment opportunity state of an individual. If s = e, the agent has a job offer
and he chooses to accept or reject the offer. If s = u, he becomes unemployed.
Let η denote the employment status of the agent. If he chooses to work η = 1, otherwise
η = 0. We can summarize the employment status of the agent as follows:
Job Offer (s = e) −→ Accept → Work for hˆ hours (η = 1)
Reject → Unemployed (η = 0)
No Job Offer (s = u) −→ Unemployed (η = 0).
(3)
It is assumed that s follows a two-state Markov chain. The transition probabilities are
given by the 2 × 2 transition matrix χ = {χ(i, j)} where i, j ∈ {e, u}. For instance, given
that the agent did not have an employment opportunity in the last period, the probability
of getting a job offer in the current period is Prob{s′ = e|s = u} = χ(u, e).
The unemployment history of an agent is denoted by t, the number of periods he has
been unemployed consecutively in the last unemployment spell. For example, if the agent
has been unemployed for 3 periods, then t = 3.
Our insurance plan is characterized by a replacement ratio of the following form:
θ(t) =
{
θt t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}
θT−1 t ≥ T
(4)
This UI plan distinguishes agents according to their unemployment history up to t = T .
For an unemployed agent, the replacement ratio is θ0 in the first period of unemployment
and θt−1 in the tth period up to the T th period. Thereafter, it will be constant at θT−1.
When T = 1, replacement ratio is constant. This case corresponds to the UI plans analyzed
in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992).
In our framework, agents who refuse job opportunities can collect UI benefits with positive
probability, pi(t). The degree of moral hazard is controlled by changing pi(t). Note that
pi(t) = 0 corresponds to perfect monitoring; i.e., no moral hazard and pi(t) = 1 corresponds
to no-monitoring, i.e., extreme moral hazard. We differentiate between the individuals who
have worked last period and who have not by letting
pi(t) =
{
pi0 for t = 0
pi1 for t > 0
(5)
and assigning different values for pi0 and pi1.
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We can summarize the unemployment insurance system as follows:
• If the agent has no job offer (s = u), then he collects benefits. The amount of benefit is
determined by the long-term UI plan according to (4). The current employment status
is η = 0 and the unemployment history becomes t′ = t+ 1.
• If the agent has a job offer (s = e) and he accepts it, then he does not receive any
benefits. Then η = 1 and t′ = 0.
• If the agent has a job offer (s = e) but he does not accept it, then he receives the UI
benefit with probability pi(t). For this case, η = 0 and t′ = t+ 1.
Let µ be the indicator that shows whether an agent receives UI benefit. If the agent receives
benefits µ = 1, otherwise µ = 0. Government uses proportional income tax to finance UI
benefits. Let τ be the proportional income tax rate. The state of the agent can be summarized
as follows:
s = u, η = 0 → t′ = t+ 1, µ = 1 and yd = (1− τ)θ(t)y;
s = e, η = 1 → t′ = 0, µ = 0 and yd = (1− τ)y;
s = e, η = 0 → t′ = t+ 1, µ = 1 and yd = (1− τ)θ(t)y with probability pi(t),
µ = 0 and yd = 0 with probability 1− pi(t);
(6)
The timing in the model is:
• At the beginning of each period, the employment opportunity state s is known to agents.
Given the employment opportunity s, asset holdingsm, and employment history t, they
choose η.
• Agents who do not receive employment opportunities collect benefits with certainty
and choose consumption and next period’s asset holdings. At the same time, agents
who work choose consumption and next period’s asset holdings.
• Agents who reject employment opportunities first learn whether they receive benefits
then they choose consumption and next period’s asset holdings according to equation
(2).
The maximization problem can be written as a dynamic programming problem. Note that
the state variables are current asset holdings m, employment opportunity s, and employment
history t. The dynamic programming problem is:
V (m,u, t) = max
m′
{
U(m+ (1− τ)θ(t)y −m′, 1) + β
∑
s′
χ(u, s′)V (m′, s′, t+ 1)
}
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{U(m+ (1− τ)y −m′, 1− hˆ) + β
∑
s′





{U(m+ (1− τ)θ(t)y −m′, 1) + β
∑
s′






{U(m−m′, 1) + β
∑
s′
χ(e, s′)V (m′, s′, t+ 1)}
]}
(7)
subject to m′ ≥ 0.
Definition: The stationary equilibrium for this economy is the set of decision rules c(x),
m′(x), η(m, s, t) where x = (m, s, t, µ), a time-invariant measure λ(x) of individuals at state
x and a tax rate τ such that
1. Given the tax rate τ , individuals solve the maximization problem in (7);






3. Government finances UI benefits by taxing income. So, the total amount of UI benefits
should be equal to the taxes paid by the employed individuals. The government budget
constraint is satisfied:∑
m,t
λ(m, e, t, 0)η(m, e, t) τy =
∑
m,t
[λ(m,u, t, 1) + λ(m, e, t, 1)] (1− τ)θ(t) y. (9)
4. The invariant measure λ(x) solves the following equation:
λ(m′, s′, t′, µ′) =





















′)λ(x) [pi(t′)(1− η′(m′, s′, t′))] s′ = e, µ′ = 1
(10)
where Ω(m′, s, t′, µ) = {(m, t) : m′ = m′(m, s, t, µ) and t′ = (t+ 1)(1− η(m, s, t))}.
The first part of equation (10) corresponds to the fraction of agents who have no job
offer and no unemployment benefit. Since every individual who does not get any job offer
receives UI benefits, the fraction of such agents is zero. The second part corresponds to the
fraction of agents who have no job offer and receive benefits. Since anybody without a job
offer receives UI benefit with certainty, this part is equal to the total fraction of individuals
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who have no job offer. The third part corresponds to the fraction of individuals who have a
job offer but do not receive UI benefits. These are the individuals who decided to work or
who rejected the job offer and did not receive benefits.3 The fourth part corresponds to the
fraction of individuals who rejected job offers and receive benefits.
2.2 The Model Economy without Savings
The economy without savings is a special case of the one that we analyzed in the previous
subsection. We restrict asset holdings to be zero in all periods, i.e., m = m′ = 0. Since agents
do not have any savings, the only source of consumption for the unemployed is UI benefits.
3 Calibration
• The utility function used in the computations has the following form:
U(c, l) =
(c1−σlσ)1−ρ − 1
1− ρ . (11)
• The time period in the model is 6 weeks and output is normalized to 1. Following
Kydland and Prescott (1982) β is set to 0.995.
• hˆ is set to 0.45 assuming that individuals have 98 hours in a week (when sleep, eating,
etc. are deducted) and they spend approximately 45 hours of this time at work.
• σ is set to 0.67 in our benchmark parameterization following Kydland and Prescott
(1982). However, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) suggests smaller values for σ. So we
check the robustness of our results by changing σ to 0.5.
• Degree of risk aversion ρ is set to 2.5 following Mehra and Prescott (1985) in the
benchmark case. We also examine how our results are affected when ρ = 10.
• Following Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), the transition matrix χ is formed such that
the employment opportunity is offered 94% of the time and the average duration of not
having an employment opportunity is 12 weeks. These requirements imply that the
transition matrix is:[
χ(e, e) χ(e, u)








• We set pi1 = 1 and consider different levels of monitoring of quitters and change pi0
from 0 to 1.
3Recall that the individuals who refuse job offers do not receive any benefits with probability 1 − pi(t′).
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4 Computation
We want to compute average utility for different ΘT = {θ(0), θ(1), θ(2), · · · , θ(T − 1), θ(T ), · · · }
sequences to find the optimal benefit scheme.
The computational procedure for a given ΘT is as follows:
1. Start with a guess for tax rate τ and solve the dynamic programming problem by value
function iteration:
(a) Form a discrete state space for (m, s, t). m is allowed to take values between 0
and 8 and a grid of 301 points is used. Since s can take only 2 values and t can
take T values, the dimension of the state space is 301× 2× T .
(b) Start with an initial guess V 0(., ., .) for V (., ., .).
(c) Calculate V n+1(., ., .) by value function iteration.
(d) Repeat (c) until value function converges.
2. Calculate λ(x) by iterating on equation (9):
(a) Start with an initial guess for λ(x).
(b) Calculate an updated λ(x) by using equation (9).
(c) Repeat this procedure until convergence.
3. Calculate the budget constraint by using equation (7). If there is a surplus (deficit)
decrease (increase) the tax rate.
4. Steps 1-4 are repeated until the equilibrium is found.
The above procedure calculates the decision rules and tax rate for a given ΘT sequence. Our
goal is to find the optimal UI plan. Calculation of the optimal UI plan requires the repetition
of above procedure for all possible ΘT sequences. In our computations, θ is allowed to take
values between 0 and 1 and a grid of 21 points is used. For T = 1, number of all possible
UI plans is just 21, but as T increases, number of possible UI plans increases dramatically.
For example for T = 4, we need to repeat the solution procedure 214 = 194, 481 times.
The dramatic increase in the computation time with increasing T makes the direct solution
impossible. Following Gomme (1997), we use an evolutionary algorithm to find the optimal
θT sequence:
1. Construct a population of twenty ΘT sequences as first guesses.
2. For each ΘT sequence in the population, calculate the average utility in the equilibrium
by using the above algorithm.
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3. Sort the population from the best to the worst according to the corresponding values
of average utility.
4. Replace the worst half of the population by the first half of the population by adding
some random noise.
5. Repeat 2-5 with the new population until all of the top ten ΘT sequences are the same.
The noise added in step 4 helps the evolutionary algorithm to escape from local minima and
at the same time explore the space of all possible ΘT sequences.
5 Social Planner’s Problem and Calculation of Welfare Gains
In the following sections, we are going to evaluate equilibrium allocations under different UI
plans. For this purpose, we solve a social planner’s problem and evaluate the gap between
the social planner’s allocation and the equilibrium allocation under a certain plan. The social




βt[NtU(c1t, 1− hˆ) + (1−Nt)U(c2t, 1)] (13)
subject to
Ntc1t + (1−Nt)c2t ≤ Nty, Nt ≤ N¯
where Nt is the employment rate, c1t is the consumption of an employed individual, and c2t
is the consumption of an unemployed individual. N¯ is the upper bound on employment rate
which was set to 0.94. This problem is static in its nature and has a simple closed form
solution as shown in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992). Let (c∗1, c∗2) be the solution to the
problem above. To compute the welfare cost of an equilibrium allocation, we calculate the
average utility, V , under that particular allocation. Then we compute the value of φ such
that the allocation (φ c∗1, φ c∗2) gives the utility V ; the welfare cost is given by 1− φ.
6 Design and Evaluation of Optimal UI Plans
In this section we examine optimal UI plans in two different economic environments. These
two sample economies are identical except for the distinction that in the first one, agents
cannot save and in the second one, they can. We compute optimal unemployment insurance
plans for different levels of government monitoring. We distinguish between agents according
to the number of periods they have been unemployed up to T periods, and find the optimal
benefit schemes by varying T from 1 to 4. We evaluate potential welfare gains of going from
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T = 1 to T = 4. Recall that T = 1 corresponds to the case where the benefits are constant
throughout the unemployment spell (short-term unemployment insurance plans), and T > 1
corresponds to the case with a changing benefit level throughout the unemployment spell
(long-term plans).4
In the following section, we present results for pi1 = 1. This situation where it is not
possible to monitor searchers seems to be empirically plausible given the fact that search
activity is hard to monitor. Although we concentrate on this case, our main results remain
robust for a wide range of pi1. In fact, even if the government can monitor 50% of searchers
(pi1 = 0.5), our results do not change significantly. In practice, it seems easier to detect
quitters than to detect searchers. Therefore, we concentrate on cases where pi0 < pi1.
6.1 Benchmark Economy:
In our benchmark economy, we set σ = 0.67, ρ = 2.5 and pi1 = 1. To understand to what
extent welfare gains from long-term UI plans depend on the degree of moral hazard in the
economy, we consider different levels of the monitoring of quitters by changing pi0 from 0 to 1.
We first present the results for the economy without savings since it is simpler. This analysis
helps us understand how allocations and welfare implications compare across economies with
and without savings.
6.1.1 Optimal Unemployment Insurance Plans without Savings
In this subsection, we evaluate long-term UI plans when agents cannot save. In this case,
the only source of consumption for the unemployed is the UI benefits. This makes it possible
for the government to perfectly monitor the consumption of agents. This is the situation
analyzed in Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
In our experiments, we change pi0 from 0 to 1 and find that the optimal benefit path is
the same for all values of pi0 such that pi0 < 1. This result is not surprising since UI benefits
are the only source of consumption for the unemployed agents and if denied benefits, they
have nothing to consume.5 Even if a small fraction of agents are monitored, agents will never
want to quit their jobs to collect benefits.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for pi0 < 1. When the benefits are constant (T = 1),
optimal benefit level is 0.25. However, as we switch to long-term plans (T = 2) it is possible
to provide higher benefit levels: 0.65 in the first period of unemployment and 0.30 thereafter.
4We have tried increasing T to 5 and seen that distinguishing agents beyond the 4th period of unemployment
does not improve welfare significantly. Given this and the computational complexity of solving the problem
for higher values of T , we carry out our analysis up to T = 4.
5Zero consumption gives a utility of −∞.
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Tax Standard Welfare
T Optimal Rate Employment Deviation of Average Cost
UI Plans (τ) Rate Consumption Utility (%)
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.0157 0.9400 0.1753 -0.5652 2.4987
2 0.65 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.0294 0.9400 0.1279 -0.5551 0.8635
3 0.65 0.65 0.30 0.30 0.0445 0.9253 0.1127 -0.5531 0.5349
4 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.30 0.0612 0.9044 0.1098 -0.5528 0.4854
Table 1: The optimal UI plans and summary statistics for the benchmark parameterization
and pi0 ∈ [0, 1), pi1 = 1.
Since most of the agents experience unemployment for less than two periods, offering a high
replacement ratio in the early periods improves welfare considerably: going from T = 1 to
T = 2 results in a welfare gain of 1.6352%. Overall, the benefit of going from T = 1 to T = 4
is 2.0133%. As can be seen in Table 1, the optimal plan increases welfare by smoothing
consumption and providing more leisure.
Tax Standard Welfare
T Optimal Rate Employment Deviation of Average Cost
UI Plans (τ) Rate Consumption Utility (%)
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.0157 0.9400 0.1753 -0.5652 2.4987
2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.0157 0.9400 0.1753 -0.5652 2.4987
3 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.0165 0.9400 0.1725 -0.5646 2.4027
4 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.0165 0.9400 0.1725 -0.5646 2.4027
Table 2: The optimal UI plans and summary statistics for the benchmark parameterization
and for pi0 = pi1 = 1.
Now, we want to analyze pi0 = 1 case. Table 2 shows that the welfare gains from switching
to long-term UI plans are small: going from T = 1 to T = 4 improves welfare by only 0.0960%.
In this case, it is not optimal to offer high benefits in the early periods of unemployment
since high benefits would induce agents to quit their jobs. Agents can take advantage of
the UI system by quitting their jobs and collecting benefits for a few periods while enjoying
leisure. They can return back to work when benefits become lower. Since quitters have high
reemployment probabilities and can easily find jobs, they are more likely to take advantage
of the UI system when high benefits are offered in the first periods. Since most of the welfare
gain from switching to long-term plans comes from offering high benefits in the early periods
of the unemployment, it is not possible to improve welfare significantly.
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Tax Standard Average Welfare
T Optimal Rate Employment Deviation of Asset Average Cost
UI Plans (τ) Rate Consumption Holdings Utility (%)
No UI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.9400 0.1202 3.2411 -0.5540 0.6830
1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0040 0.9220 0.1206 2.2323 -0.5539 0.6665
2 0.90 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0297 0.9349 0.1136 1.3764 -0.5529 0.5019
3 0.90 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.0287 0.9400 0.1117 1.4334 -0.5528 0.4854
4 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.0302 0.9399 0.1121 1.2050 -0.5526 0.4825
Table 3: The optimal UI plans and summary statistics for the benchmark parameterization
and for pi0 = 0, pi1 = 1.
6.1.2 Optimal Unemployment Insurance Plans with Hidden Savings
Now we consider hidden savings. Similar to the previous case we again change pi0 from 0 to
1. Table 3 reports the results for perfect government monitoring, i.e., pi0 = 0.6 In this case,
nobody quits his job to collect benefits since quitters will definitely be disqualified. When
benefits are constant, optimal replacement ratio is only 0.05. Agents insure themselves mainly
by saving and the welfare gain from the unemployment insurance system is almost zero. Then
we increase T to 2. The optimal plan offers 0.9 in the first period of unemployment and 0.05
thereafter. The welfare benefit of going from T = 1 to T = 2 is equal to 0.1646%. Agents
hold substantially lower assets and enjoy smoother consumption. High benefit levels in the
first period of unemployment give incentive for searchers to accept job offers; because, if they
are laid off, they can enjoy both leisure and high benefits in the first period of unemployment.
This is why a smaller number of agents turn down job offers and employment rate will be
higher. Changing T from 2 to 4 increases welfare by less than 0.02%.
When T > 2, the optimal benefit scheme is not monotonic. The benefit level starts with
a high rate, then decreases to zero, and continues at a low rate indefinitely. This interesting
result deserves some explanation. The insurance administrator recognizes that agents in the
first period of unemployment are really the ones who did not get any job offer, so he does
not have to be concerned about the incentive problem for these agents. Therefore, it is
possible to provide insurance to agents by offering high benefit levels. In the latter periods,
the government cannot monitor the unemployed. Since agents have hidden savings, they
are tempted to cheat to get the highest net present value transfer from the unemployment
insurance system. This makes it difficult for the government to provide insurance. Thus, it
6Although perfect monitoring is almost impossible in real life, we would like to analyze this case to provide
better understanding of long-term plans for different levels of monitoring.
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pi0 T Optimal UI Plans Welfare Cost (%) Welfare Gain (%)
0.00 T=1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.6665 0.6665 - 0.4825 =
T=4 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.4825 0.1840
0.10 T=1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.6665 0.6665 - 0.5546 =
T=4 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.5546 0.1119
0.25 T=1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.6830 0.6830 - 0.6199 =
T=4 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.6199 0.0631
0.50 T=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.6830 0.6830 - 0.6340 =
T=4 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.6340 0.0490
1.00 T=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.6830 0.6830 - 0.6340 =
T=4 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.6340 0.0490
Table 4: The optimal UI plans and the welfare gains for benchmark parameterization and
pi1 = 1, pi0 ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1}.
is optimal not to offer any benefits until agents consume most of their savings. So, benefits
drop to zero for two periods. As savings get smaller, consumption will depend more on UI
benefits. Now, positive benefits are required to insure unemployed agents.
Our analysis reveals the importance of agents’ ability to save in evaluating long-term
UI plans. When we abstracted from this feature—agents cannot save—we have found that
switching to long-term UI plans could increase welfare by 2.0133%. However, when we
introduce hidden savings, the corresponding gain becomes as low as 0.1840%.
Next we evaluate the optimal UI plans for different levels of pi0. Table 4 reports the
optimal plans for T = 1 and T = 4 and the welfare gains of going from T = 1 to T = 4.
For various values of pi0, benefit schemes are very similar except for the first-period benefit
level. For higher values of pi0, replacement ratio in the first period becomes smaller. Even if
pi0 is increased from 0 to 0.1, the replacement ratio drops from 0.90 to 0.25. This is because,
when quitters can qualify for unemployment insurance with a positive probability, agents are
tempted to quit their jobs to collect benefits if high benefits are offered in the first period
of unemployment spell. If they manage to go undetected, they collect UI benefits and enjoy
leisure. If not, they can consume out of their savings while they search for a job. Since
they have high reemployment probability, the possibility of being detected is not such a bad
outcome.7 That is why it is not possible to offer high benefits in the first period without
creating incentive to quit when government monitoring of quitters is imperfect.
Non-monotonic or increasing benefit schemes look quite different than declining benefit
paths suggested by Shavell and Weiss (1979), and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). How-
7Recall that quitters will be given employment opportunity with 0.9681 probability.
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Figure 1: Consumption of the unemployed agents under different UI plans for benchmark
parameterization and pi0 = 0, pi1 = 1.
ever, the intuition behind these seemingly different results are similar. Despite the non-
monotonicity of the benefit scheme, the implied consumption path is declining throughout
the unemployment spell as Figure 1 suggests. To create incentives for agents to accept job
offers, the optimal UI plan should punish agents for continued unemployment by providing
a declining consumption path throughout the unemployment spell. The optimal benefit and
the consumption path are quite different in our model because agents have hidden savings.
Our results indicate how introducing hidden savings can lead to different policy implications.
As Table 4 shows, the welfare gains of switching to long-term UI plans depend on the
degree of moral hazard for quitters. For pi0 = 0 welfare benefit of going from T = 1 to T = 4
is 0.1840%. However, when pi0 is increased to 0.1 and 0.25, the welfare gains are 0.1119% and
0.0631% respectively. As we increase pi0 above 0.5, the corresponding gain drops to 0.049%.
Even if the government can monitor quitters quite effectively as in pi0 = 0.25 case (75% of
ineligible agents are detected), the welfare gain of switching to long-term UI plans is quite
small. Since potential welfare benefits are small even for low degrees of moral hazard and
implementing long-term UI plans is costly in practice, we argue that switching to long-term
UI plans is not that attractive from a policy point of view.
6.2 Robustness
The equilibrium properties of the model can change when we consider different parameter
values. In particular, the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the weight of leisure in the
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utility function are most likely to affect the optimal benefit path.8
6.2.1 The Value of Leisure:
First we would like to start with a discussion of how leisure’s weight in the utility function
changes our results. Following Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), who suggest a lower value of
leisure in their study, we set σ to 0.5. In this case, agents value leisure less compared to our
benchmark parameterization and, thus, the importance of moral hazard decreases. Therefore,
for a given value of pi0 agents are less likely to take advantage of imperfect government
monitoring, and it is possible to offer higher benefit levels without creating disincentives to
become and remain unemployed.
Optimal Average Welfare
T UI Plans Utility Cost (%)
1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.4068 0.7266
4 0.75 0.55 0.55 0.55 -0.4028 0.2312
Table 5: The optimal UI plans and the welfare gains for σ = 0.5, pi0 ∈ [0, 1) and pi1 = 1.
Table 5 shows optimal UI plans and the welfare gains in the economy without savings.
When benefits are constant, optimal replacement ratio is 0.5. Since it is possible to insure
agents quite well even with constant benefit schemes by offering high benefits, the welfare
gains of switching to long-term plans are relatively small compared to σ = 0.67 case. Note
that when σ = 0.67, the welfare gain of going from T = 1 to T = 4 was 2.0133%. When
σ = 0.5, the corresponding welfare gain is 0.4954%.
Optimal Average Welfare
T UI Plans Utility Cost (%)
No UI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.4075 0.8157
1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 -0.4039 0.2684
4 1.00 0.40 0.45 0.50 -0.4019 0.1166
Table 6: The optimal UI plans and summary statistics for σ = 0.5, pi0 ∈ [0, 0.5], and pi1 = 1.
Next we want to evaluate optimal plans when σ = 0.5 in the presence of hidden savings.
Table 6 displays the results for this case. Similar to the exercise without savings, constant
benefit schemes insure agents quite well. In this case, adding a UI system with constant
replacement ratio reduces the welfare cost from 0.8157% to 0.2684%. This implies a welfare




gain of 0.5473%. On the other hand, going from T = 1 to T = 4 increases welfare by only
0.1518%. Compared to the welfare gain of introducing a UI system to the economy, the gain
of switching to the long-term UI plan is much smaller.
This exercise shows that when disincentive effects due to moral hazard are less important,
it is possible to provide insurance with constant benefit schemes. Therefore, the welfare gains
of switching to long-term UI plans are relatively small as we have discussed above.
6.2.2 Risk Aversion:
Next, we want to describe the behavior of the economy when higher degree of risk aversion is
assumed. When risk aversion is higher, agents prefer smoother consumption of the composite
commodity, c1−σlσ.
Table 7 displays the results for ρ = 10 in the economy without savings. Compared to our
benchmark case, replacement rates are lower in general and benefit schemes are flatter. Since
more risk-averse agents prefer smoother consumption of the composite commodity, benefit
levels should be lower to provide a smoother utility. If replacement rate were higher, the
utility of an unemployed agent would be much higher than that of an employed agent.9
Optimal Average Welfare
T UI Plans Utility Cost (%)
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 -4.3442 1.5808
4 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.25 -4.1899 0.4061
Table 7: The optimal UI plans and the welfare gains for ρ = 10, pi0 = 0 and pi1 = 1.
Finally, we want to describe the behavior of the economy with hidden savings for ρ = 10.
Table 8 displays the results. Compared to ρ = 2.5 case, benefit levels are generally higher and
benefit paths are flatter. These results follow from the fact that more risk-averse agents prefer
smoother consumption of the composite commodity, c1−σlσ. When the replacement ratio is
constant, the optimal level is 0.2. Recall that, when ρ = 2.5, the corresponding replacement
ratio was 0.05, implying a much smaller composite commodity for the unemployed. Then
the only way to smooth the consumption of the composite commodity is to increase the
consumption of goods (c) since leisure for the unemployed is already high. That is why
benefit levels are higher when agents are more risk averse. The reason why long-term plans
are flatter compared to the benchmark case is also very similar: since every unemployed agent
9When ρ = 2.5 replacement ratio in the first few periods of unemployment was 0.65. Then, the amount of
composite commodity consumed by the unemployed agent will be 0.650.3310.67 = 0.8675. For the employed
agent the consumption is around 0.94 and leisure is 0.55. Then the composite commodity of the employed
agent is 0.940.330.550.67 = 0.6564. Note that instantaneous utility of the unemployed agent is higher.
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enjoys the same amount of leisure, the only way to provide a smoother utility flow over the
unemployment spell is to provide a lower benefit level in the first period of unemployment
and higher benefit levels in the later periods.10
For ρ = 10, when we introduce an unemployment insurance system with a constant
benefit level, the welfare cost reduces from 0.5168% to 0.2255%. This implies a welfare gain
of 0.2913%. However, using long-term plans do not improve welfare significantly: as we go
from T = 1 to T = 4 the improvement in welfare is only 0.0629%.11
T Optimal Average Welfare
UI Plans Utility Cost (%)
No UI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.2041 0.5168
1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 -4.1668 0.2255
4 0.65 0.20 0.15 0.20 -4.1591 0.1626
Table 8: The optimal UI plans and summary statistics for ρ = 10, pi0 = 0, and pi1 = 1.
7 Role of Savings:
Our experiments show that policy implications change considerably when hidden savings are
taken into account. UI plans designed without considering savings can cause high unem-
ployment and be quite harmful if applied to an economy with hidden savings. This section
illustrates this argument quantitatively. We compare the employment rates for the economy
with hidden savings when a) the optimal UI plans suggested by the same economy are ap-
plied; b) the optimal UI plans suggested by the economy without savings are applied. Table
9 shows that if UI plans are designed without considering hidden savings, they might be
quite harmful to the economy. For example, for T = 1 the employment rate decreases from
92% to 52% and the welfare cost increases from 0.0665% to 10.4504%. It is remarkable that
the long-term UI plans suggested by the economy without savings cause even higher unem-
ployment rates and higher welfare cost. For example, for T = 4 employment rate decreases
from 94% to 24.3% and the welfare cost increases from 0.4825% to 42.0459%. This is because
this plan critically uses history dependence; in particular, it applies high benefit rates in the
first few periods upon job loss. Thus, any recently separated workers with access to hidden
10When ρ = 2.5, the optimal benefit scheme for T = 4 is (0.95,0,0,0.10) and when ρ = 10, the optimal
benefit scheme is (0.65,0.20,0.15,0.20).
11When we tried higher values of pi0 we have seen that the the optimal benefit level for T = 1 does not
change significantly. For instance, when pi0 = 0.5 the constant benefit scheme still offers 0.20. So, the welfare
benefit of introducing an UI plan is 0.2913%. However, higher levels of moral hazard decreases the welfare
benefit of switching to long-term plans. Thus, the welfare gains will be less than 0.0629%.
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savings would choose to turn down new job offers, collect the high benefit, and use hidden
savings to smooth consumption.
Optimal UI Plan 1 Optimal UI Plan 2
T=1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Employment Rate 0.9220 0.5204
Tax Rate 0.0040 0.1633
Welfare Cost (%) 0.6665 10.4504
T=2 0.90 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.65 0.30 0.30 0.30
Employment Rate 0.9349 0.3736
Tax Rate 0.0297 0.2946
Welfare Cost (%) 0.5019 20.2501
T=3 0.90 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.65 0.65 0.30 0.30
Employment Rate 0.9400 0.3261
Tax Rate 0.0287 0.3971
Welfare Cost (%) 0.4854 28.8593
T=4 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.30
Employment Rate 0.9399 0.2431
Tax Rate 0.0302 0.5773
Welfare Cost (%) 0.4825 42.0459
Table 9: The optimal UI plans derived in economies with and without savings and their
effects on the economy with savings for benchmark parameterization and pi0 = 0, pi1 = 1.
This exercise clearly reveals the importance of general equilibrium effects in the design of
unemployment insurance plans. In the absence of such effects, the tax rate on labor income
would be independent of the unemployment rate. Thus, the value of being employed would
be immune to the disincentive effects created by the unemployment insurance plans designed
ignoring agents’ ability to save. However, when we incorporate general equilibrium effects to
the analysis, we observe that the lower the employment rate is, the higher the tax rate on
labor income of the employed should be. This is to balance the budget of the UI system. This
feedback—which indeed is present in real life—exacerbates the negative effects of improperly
designed UI systems on the economy.
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8 Conclusion
We have studied short-term and long-term unemployment insurance plans in economies with
and without savings. We find that welfare implications change notably when we consider
savings. Although long-term plans can improve welfare significantly in economies without
savings, our experiments suggest that welfare gains are much lower when hidden savings are
taken into account.
Potential welfare gains of long-term plans depend on the degree of moral hazard. However,
for a wide range of moral hazard values, we find that welfare gains of long-term unemployment
insurance plans are close to zero. Our conclusion is not affected by plausible variations in
parameters including the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the weight of leisure in the
utility function.
We recognize that our results are not strictly comparable to those of the dynamic con-
tracting literature since our plans do not keep track of the entire unemployment history of
workers. One might argue that contracts that depend only on the most recent unemployment
spell and distinguish agents up to four periods can be considered short-term contracts. How-
ever, we have shown that these contracts, in fact, improve welfare considerably in economies
without savings. This result suggests that the small welfare gains we obtain with hidden
savings are not a consequence of limited history dependence but rather a consequence of hid-
den savings. Given these results, as well as the fact that long-term unemployment insurance
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